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Contractual Construction of Jurisdiction 
Agreements: Exclusive or Non-Exclusive - Hin-
Pro International Logistics Limited v Compania 
Sud Americana De Vapores S.A. [2015] EWCA 
Civ 401 
 
The English Court of Appeal’s decision in Hin-Pro International Logistics 
Limited v Compania Sud Americana De Vapores S.A. [2015] EWCA Civ 401 is 
a case of note to Singapore as it took on the complex task of construing the effect 
of a jurisdiction agreement contained in a standard form bill of lading. The 
detailed contractual analysis has many points of reflection for Singapore law, 
given that the Singapore Court of Appeal has recently considered a contractual 
construction approach to jurisdiction agreements.  
 
Singapore’s approach: no bright-line division between exclusive and 
non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements  
 
“Strong cause” or Spiliada test? 
 
By conventional wisdom, most textbooks and courts tend to discuss the subject 
of jurisdiction agreements by simplistically dividing them into two categories: 
(a) an exclusive jurisdiction agreement; and (b) a non-exclusive jurisdiction 
agreement. An exclusive jurisdiction agreement is in essence an agreement 
between parties that they will only submit their disputes (falling within the 
scope of the clause) to the contractual forum and nowhere else. Bringing 
proceedings in another forum amounts to a breach of contract. Therefore, 
where the plaintiff has brought the dispute to the Singapore courts in 
accordance with the exclusive jurisdiction agreement, the defendant who 
wishes to litigate elsewhere must show “strong cause” amounting to exceptional 
circumstances to justify the breach of contract in order to succeed in his stay of 
proceedings application. The “strong cause” test looks beyond the foreseeable 
convenience factors as these are taken to be within the parties’ contemplation 
in agreeing on the choice of dispute forum. The test requires a high threshold 
to be met and is generally focused on unforeseeable factors and the ends of 
justice.  
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Where a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement is concerned, the court applies 
the familiar Spiliada test (propounded by the House of Lords in Spiliada 
Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] AC 460). It has been clarified by the 
Singapore Court of Appeal in Orchard Capital I Ltd v Ravindra Kumar 
Jhunjhunwala [2012] 2 SLR 519 that the jurisdiction agreement is one of the 
factors to be considered in the Spiliada test as to whether the contractual forum 
should exercise its jurisdiction. The precise weight to be ascribed to the 
jurisdiction agreement in this exercise would depend on the circumstances of 
the case at hand (at [25]). In coming to this view, the Court of Appeal was very 
much persuaded by Professor Yeo Tiong Min’s sophisticated analysis in  “The 
Contractual Basis of the Enforcement of Exclusive and Non-Exclusive Choice of 
Court Agreements” (2005) 17 SAcLJ 306.  
 
Contractual construction  
 
Professor Yeo’s other strand of analysis in relation to jurisdiction agreements 
was also broadly approved, though with some reservations, by the Court of 
Appeal. In essence, Professor Yeo argued in the article that there is no real 
distinction between exclusive jurisdiction agreements and non-exclusive 
jurisdiction agreements as a matter of principle, although the divide has some 
practical utility. In his view, the content of the agreement between the parties 
is a matter of contractual construction in accordance with the proper law of the 
contract. Whilst the Court of Appeal found Yeo’s thesis persuasive, it also 
recognised that it is not without difficulties, namely, a contractual approach 
might be impractical to be applied at an interlocutory stage and that it could 
lead to uncertainty (at [26]). Accordingly, it was not ready to “whole-heartedly” 
accept the approach recommended by Professor Yeo (at [26]), especially since 
neither party to the dispute referred to Professor Yeo’s arguments. 
Nevertheless, on the assumption that Professor Yeo’s approach was to be fully 
adopted, the Court of Appeal said that the parties’ intention is to be gathered 
from the contractual language and if Singapore law is the proper law of the 
contract, the intention is to be determined by reference to the context (at [27]). 
And on the contractual analysis, the Court of Appeal said that the argument for 
an “exclusive” characterisation would fail as well.  
 
In the later case of Abdul Rashid bin Abdul Manaf v Hii Yii Ann [2014] 4 SLR 
1042, the High Court said (at [45]-[47]) that the labels of “exclusive” and “non-
exclusive” will be ascribed their ordinary meanings, unless they are not 
supported by the context in which they are used or if they are not consistent 
with the rest of the contractual provisions. 
 
Notably, in Orchard Capital, the Court of Appeal has advised that counsel 
should “pay close attention” to Professor Yeo’s article in a dispute concerning 
jurisdiction agreements (at [3]). To fully grasp the contractual analysis of the 
jurisdiction agreement, one would also do well to consider decisions adopting 
a predominantly contractual approach to such clauses. To this end, the English 
Court of Appeal judgment in Hin-Pro International Logistics Limited is one 
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Hin-Pro International Logistics Limited: contractual construction 
 
The jurisdiction agreement in Hin-Pro International Logistics Limited is a 
standard term contained in a standard form bill of lading provided by 
Compania Sud Americana de Vapores S.A. (“CSAV”). The relevant clause 
provides as follows: 
 
23    Law and jurisdiction  
 
This Bill of Lading and any claim or dispute arising hereunder 
shall be subject to English law and the jurisdiction of the English 
High Court of Justice in London. If, notwithstanding the 
foregoing, any proceedings are commenced in another 
jurisdiction, such proceedings shall be referred to ordinary 
courts of law. In the case of Chile, arbitrators shall not be 
competent to deal with any such dispute and proceedings shall 
be referred to the Chilean Ordinary Courts.  
 
Hin-Pro International Logistics Ltd (“Hin-Pro”), a freight forwarder registered 
in Hong Kong, brought proceedings against CSAV in the Chinese courts under 
five bills of lading (containing Clause 23 above) covering the carriage of cargo 
from China to Venezuela, claiming that the cargo was released without the 
production of the original bills. The nub of the appeal before the English Court 
of Appeal is whether Clause 23 is an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Getting to this 
particular characterisation issue involved answering other questions but they 
need not be addressed in present discussion.  
 
It is noteworthy that Clause 23 is not labeled “exclusive” or “non-exclusive”. 
What is apparent is that the drafting of Clause 23 envisages proceedings might 
be brought in courts other than the English High Court. Indeed, these were Hin-
Pro’s arguments in favour of a “non-exclusive” characterisation. Yet, the 
English Court of Appeal held that Clause 23 is to be construed as an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement.  
 
The Court said that the bill of ladings, as with all commercial contracts, are to 
be interpreted “in the light of the facts which were known to the original parties 
to it or which were reasonably available to them in the situation in which they 
were at the time of the contract”, citing Rainy Sky v Kookmin [2011] 1 WLR 
2900 at [14]. It then canvassed the various factors that might or might not 
impact on the interpretation of Clause 23, and these are set out below with some 
brief observations and comments.  
 
Language of the contract  
 
The bill of lading contract is in English. But the Court did not think that this 
fact should affect the interpretation, rejecting Hin Pro’s argument to the 
contrary that the contract would be issued to companies whose staff’s first 
language might not be English and these persons might understand the terms 
of the contract differently. It was explained (at [58]) that Hin Pro’s submission, 
if accepted, would involve a difficult exercise of determining “which first 
language the reasonable man is to be taken as speaking” and the interpretation 
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of the same contract would vary depending on the “non-English first language 
chosen”. The Court rightly said that in agreeing to a contract written in English, 
“the parties must be taken to have agreed that it shall be interpreted with all the 
nuances of the English language and in the way that a speaker whose first or 
only language was English would do so”.  
 
This must be right. Commercial parties are expected to undertake costs to have 
the terms of the contract reviewed by lawyers with the necessary legal and 
language competence, and if they fail to do so, they proceed to sign the contract 
at their own risk.  
 
Contractual language and structure  
 
The Court then considered the language of Clause 23. Considerable weight was 
ascribed to the “imperative and directory” words of “shall be subject to” which 
point towards the clause being an exclusive jurisdiction agreement. The Court 
was of the view that such an interpretation is consistent with English 
authorities.   
 
This is a familiar canon of construction. That being the case, the language used 
is merely a factor in the construction exercise, albeit an important one. 
Nevertheless, one must be careful to distinguish between words that are 
indicative of parties’ intention and words that are less indicative, as well as what 
is the precise intention that the words are indicative of. The words “shall be 
subject to” in particular are not entirely indicative of the intended effect of the 
clause because all they mean is that parties agreed to submit to the jurisdiction 
of the English High Court. After all, it is very common for parties to provide that 
they “shall submit to the non-exclusive jurisdiction of Court X”.  The choice of 
the word “shall” is simply a convention of drafting of such clauses.  
 
As for the phrase “If notwithstanding the foregoing, any proceedings are 
commenced in another jurisdiction”, the Court interpreted it as meaning “If 
notwithstanding the parties’ agreement that all claims or disputes arising under 
the bill of lading shall be determined in accordance with English law and by the 
English High Court” (at [67]).  Quite clearly, this interpretation is one that is 
arrived at due to other considerations, as the language itself does not mandate 
it.  
 
Finally, the Court had to reconcile the provision for the event of litigation in 
other jurisdictions in the second and third sentences of Clause 23 with an 
exclusive jurisdiction agreement characterisation. The provision, it was said, 
was to cater for litigation being brought in jurisdictions which would render the 
first sentence ineffective or do not recognise the effect of an exclusive 
jurisdiction agreement as understood by the common law jurisdictions (at 
[68]).  
 
In other words, the Court read the second and third sentences as a provision for 
the contingency of a party acting in breach of their agreement to litigate only in 
England by bringing proceedings in a court which will disregard their 
agreement. This is not an implausible interpretation but parties who wish to 
make provision for such kinds of contingency are advised to spell out the 
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intended effect as clearly as possible. The Court’s interpretation in this case is 
probably reinforced by the fact that the bill of lading is governed by English law 
and English courts are best placed to apply English law.  
 
Context and Commercial Sense  
 
The Court took note that this is a contract between corporations engaged in 
international trade, as opposed to a consumer contract or an insurance contract 
(at [55]-[56]). Where it is a consumer contract, there may be concerns of 
consumer protection that are translated into certain interpretative techniques 
or tendency. As for an insurance contract, it is observed that it is more likely 
that the assured is the party who is suing, and this “‘very limited’ mutuality of 
the clause in practice” is a significant factor (at [56]).   
 
The Court also took note of the fact that the standard form bill of lading contract 
in the present case is of widespread use and is issued to other parties concerning 
CSAV’s other shipments to different parts of the world (at [65]). Accordingly, 
many courts could have jurisdiction over disputes arising out of or in 
connection with the bill of lading, and “it makes little commercial sense to add 
England as an optional additional court, but without any obligation on either 
party to litigate there” (at [64]). This is notwithstanding the Court’s acceptance 
that a non-exclusive English jurisdiction agreement is “not wholly worthless or 
otiose even where there is express provision of English law” (at [63]).   
 
That the standard form of contract would be used with many contracting parties 
in many parts of the world is certainly a relevant factor. But whether this should 
suggest that the jurisdiction agreement in question is exclusive or non-exclusive 
in character is dependent on the circumstances of the case. For instance, 
whether it would be advantageous for the party providing the standard form to 
have all disputes being brought in one country as opposed to having the option 
to sue in different jurisdictions, typically the home jurisdictions of the counter-
party bearing in mind debt recovery/asset concentration considerations. 
Another relevant factor might be certainty in knowing where disputes will be 
brought.  
 
Governing law  
 
For the English courts, at least, where the contract provides for both English 
law and English jurisdiction, there is a tendency to read the jurisdiction 
agreement as being an exclusive one, unless there is provision to the contrary. 
As the Court in Hin-Pro International Logistics Limited said (at [66]): 
 
Third, there is obvious sense in making both English law and 
English jurisdiction mandatory. Whilst foreign courts may (but 
will not necessarily) apply English law if that is what the parties 
have agreed, England is the best forum for the application of its 
own law. 
 
The Court also thought that the tendency to construe such clauses as exclusive 
confirms that this is the likely view that reasonable businessman would take (at 
[78]).  
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The Court’s conclusion is supported by the fact that the standard form bill of 
lading contract is issued to many contracting parties from different 
jurisdictions, and there is always a risk that some of these foreign jurisdiction 
may not apply English law, thereby defeating the parties’ intention. This 
argument applies with less force in a case where the contract is only entered 
into with one party, especially where the alternative forum is identified and 
there is strong evidence suggesting that it will apply English law, albeit not with 
the same level of competence as the English court.  
 
Contra proferentem rule?  
 
Hin-Pro, in arguing for an exclusive jurisdiction agreement interpretation, also 
tried to rely on the contra proferentem rule but the Court did not think much 
assistance could be sought from it (at [69]). The rule states that the person who 
proposes the wording of the clause is assumed to have considered his own 
interests in the drafting and as such any ambiguity is to be resolved against him. 
The Court noted that there is authority saying that the rule is rarely of any 
assistance in the interpretation of commercial contracts, even though it may 
sometimes be applied in interpreting a standard form contract (At [69]-[70]). 
The Court further noted that the contra proferentem rule has not yet been 
invoked in the interpretation of jurisdiction agreements but did not say it ought 
not apply as a matter of principle (at [72]).  
 
Carefully analysing the benefits brought by Clause 23, the Court reached the 
view that it “binds and benefits both parties in the same or, at any rate, a similar 
way” as its benefit is to provide certainty: the choice of a neutral forum that 
applies its own law (at [76]). This is especially evident in the present factual 
matrix because the same standard form contract is of widespread use. It is not 
at all easy to predict in advance whether it might be more advantageous for 
CSAV or the counter party in a particular type of dispute for the dispute to be 
brought in the English High Court (at [76]).  
 
The Court’s reasoning is eminently sensible. But its conclusion does not 
foreclose the possibility of applying the rule in other cases where there is a clear 
advantage to one party but not the other in having the disputes litigated in the 
contractually chosen forum.  
 
Relevance of relevant statutory provisions or international instruments   
 
The Court also considered the significance of Article 21(1)(d) of the Hamburg 
Rules which renders the first sentence of Clause 23 void to the extent that it 
provides for exclusivity. It was thus contended by Hin-Pro that the Court ought 
to construe Clause 23 in a way that is consistent with Article 21(1)(d), that is to 
say, as a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. The Court rejected the 
submission, stating that its effect on a part of Clause 23 has no bearing on how 
it is to be interpreted in English law.  
 
The Court also briefly highlighted the issue of whether the civil procedure on 
service out of the jurisdiction ought to affect the interpretation of Clause 23. 
Whilst considering the matter not beyond debate, it also thought that it would 
be “unrealistic to regard the knowledge of both parties to these bill of lading 
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contracts as extending the provision of the [UK Civil Procedure Rules]” (at 
[59]).   
 
Nevertheless, the English Court of Appeal’s particular views in this case 
notwithstanding, the general position is that courts do endeavor to interpret 
contracts in a way that ensures its validity. As such, it is not in vain in other 
cases to argue the significance of any prohibiting statutory rule, in particular, if 




In sum, therefore, all circumstances of the case will be considered and the 
factors are looked at in the round. A fight on jurisdiction is often the main battle 
between the parties in a dispute. It is thus imperative that the approach and 
principles regarding the determination of the effect of a jurisdiction agreement 
are clarified.  
 
 
Yip Man (Assistant Professor, Singapore Management University) 
 
 
* This blog entry may be cited as Yip Man, "Contractual Construction of Jurisdiction 
Agreements: Exclusive or Non-Exclusive - Hin-Pro International Logistics Limited v 
Compania Sud Americana De Vapores S.A. [2015] EWCA Civ 401", Singapore Law Blog 
(8 May 2015)  
(http://www.singaporelawblog.sg/blog/article/109) 
 
